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This paper uses prefecture-level panel data from Japan, spanning the period 
1989–2003, to examine the influence of social norms and fractionalization on voting 
behavior.  The key findings obtained from analysis via the fixed effects estimation, 
which controls for unobserved prefecture-specific fixed effects, are as follows:  (1) the 
voter turnout is higher in close-knit communities, indicating that social norms 
enhance voting; (2) fractionalization, from both economic and generational standpoints, 
lowers the voter turnout; and (3) a lack of social capital can lead to the distribution of 
votes being spread thinly among the competing parties. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Literature in the field of social science is increasingly concerned with the 
influence of social heterogeneity on various human behaviors such as trust (Alesina 
and La Ferrara, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2006; Leigh, 2006 a, b), conflict (Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol, 2005), redistribution (Lind, 2006), leaning from neighbors(Yamamura, 
2008a) and collective action (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Costa 
and Kahn, 2003; La Ferrara, 2002; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Vigdor, 2004, Yamamura, 
2008b).  It is acknowledged that a socially and culturally homogeneous society can 
produce cohesiveness and collective action; the gaining of a benefit from collective 
action is a common result within society (Vigdor, 2004, Yamamura, 2008b).  Kaniovski 
and Mueller (2006) attempted to explore how heterogeneity affects voter turnout, and 
found that linguistic heterogeneity has a significant negative effect on voter turnout. 
The fact that the attitudes and conduct of others can influence a person‟s behavior 
is evident among neighbors and colleagues in schools and workplaces (Manski, 1993).  
This interactive mechanism also applies to a person‟s voting behavior (Calabrese et al., 
2006; Nelson, 1994).  Interactions among people, through conversations and 
discussion concerning an election, can work alongside publicized election information 
to draw attention to the election, thereby causing people to vote: a person is more likely 
to vote if those around them are interested in the election.  Furthermore, people 
appear to have a greater tendency to consider voting as a civic duty in a society in 
which political activity is pervasive.  Such an interactive mechanism is plausibly 
associated with the cohesiveness of society (Putnam, 2000).  Knack (1992) considered 
voter participation as a form of collective action and suggested that voter turnout in 
large elections is positively associated with the social norm via social sanctions. 
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If a person does not participate in a community activity that is beneficial to the 
community as a whole, he or she may feel embarrassed and thereby experience the 
psychological cost of not participating in the activity.  The psychological cost of failing 
to vote depends on voting social norms that are shaped by local interactions (Funk, 
2005; 2007).  For example, neighborhood watch is likely to be more effective if the 
community members are closely related.  Individuals prefer to interact with others 
who are similar to themselves in terms of features such as income, generation, and 
race (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000).  The cost of not voting is therefore higher in a 
relatively homogeneous community.  As suggested above, social cohesiveness and 
heterogeneity appear to play a crucial role in voting behavior.  Nonetheless, little is 
known about the mechanism of voting behavior in a relatively racially homogeneous 
society such as Japan1. 
The degree of heterogeneity of a social structure can be considered not only from a 
linguistic viewpoint (Kaniovski and Mueller, 2006) but also from generational and 
economic viewpoints; however, few researchers have addressed the impact of economic 
and generational heterogeneity upon voting behavior. 
The process of voting can be described as follows.  First, an individual might be 
interested in a candidates or particular issues2.  Second, he or she might assess the 
net benefit of voting and then determine whether or not to vote.  As such, voting 
behavior is a two-step system, yet few studies analyze voting behavior in this way; 
consequently, the aim of this paper is to ascertain the determinants of voting 
participation and the distribution of votes among the competing parties. 
                                                   
1 The proportion of Japanese within the population of Japan is 99% (Asahi shinbunsha, 
various years). 
2 For instance, it is widely acknowledged that the question of voter reaction to tax 
changes has been a central concern (Gibson, 1994). 
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Until now, cross-section estimations have been used to investigate voting 
behavior, but it appears that these types of estimation results omit variable bias due to 
unobserved individual specific effects.  Jordahl (2006) attempted to assess the 
determinants of voting behavior after controlling for unobservable fixed effects using 
panel data from Sweden.  Following these results, the present study uses 
prefecture-level panel data from Japan and employs fixed effects estimations3 to 
ascertain the determinants of the voter turnout and distribution of votes.  It is also 
important to consider whether the outcomes of policy reflect the individual vote and 
the extent to which a vote being cast is dependent upon the degree of political 
representation, measured by the per capita representation.  For this reason, political 
representation is taken into account to avoid omitted variable bias (Atlas et al., 1995; 
Meyer and Naka, 1999).  Nevertheless, the index of political representation is affected 
by institutional and demographic change and is therefore flawed.  To remove this bias, 
Kawaura‟s (2003) relative representation index is used. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  A literature review is 
presented in Section II. Section III surveys voting in Japan and advances a testable 
hypothesis.  Section IV presents a simple econometric framework, and Section V 
discusses the results of the estimations.  The final section offers concluding 
observations. 
 
II. RELATED LITERATURE  
      Since the seminal work of Downs (1957), a number of researchers have 
                                                   
3 A number of researchers have employed fixed effects model to examine the 
relationship between resource allocation and legislative representation (Atlas et al., 
1995; Meyer and Naka, 1999; Kawaura, 2003). 
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attempted to investigate the paradox of election turnouts in which people vote even 
though their marginal gain is zero (e.g., Greene and Nikolaev, 1999; Matos and Barros, 
2004; Kaniovski and Mueller, 2006).  To help explain this paradox, Downs (1957) 
stated that social factors such as a civic duty embed the individual in a social 
relationship, thereby resulting in such actions. 
Matos and Barros (2004) considered each individual as an element of a social 
network, and suggested that ethical values or social norms might influence the 
direction of an individual‟s voting attitude.  This view supports the argument that 
voting turnout will be higher in cases of stronger interpersonal interactions and 
stronger community networks (Uhlaner, 1989).  Taking both individual rationality 
and social network into account, the extent of an individual‟s voting participation 
depends on their personal characteristics, including education, income and property, 
and the features of the community to which he or she belongs, such as social norms, 
heterogeneity, and degree of economic inequality. 
  Earlier reports on the subject (Coleman, 1990; Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999) have 
stated that the interpersonal pressure to vote, depending on the social norm or a social 
network, is the critical determinant of voting participation.  Put more precisely, the 
cost of social sanctions from co-citizens provide an incentive to vote as a civic duty 
(Knack, 1992; Opp, 2001).   Table 1 summarizes the findings of Knack (1992) using 
Logit estimation showing that a churchgoer is more likely to vote while a newcomer is 
less likely to, which reflects the degree that individuals are integrated into a 
community and how they perceive pressure from other community members.   
  As suggested in the case of the participation of various communities (Alesina et 
al., 1999; Costa and Kahn, 2003), it seems appropriate to expect heterogeneity to 
6 
 
undermine collective action and thereby cause people to not vote.  This would hold in 
the case of economic fractionalization, namely inequality (Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2000; La Ferrara, 2002), and generational heterogeneity (Vigdor, 2004) 4 .  The 
accumulated evidence is consistent with the assertion presented by Uhlaner (1989) 
that voting turnout will be higher when groups have higher levels of unanimity with 
regard to the candidates.  As indicated in Table 1, the recent work of Kaniovski and 
Mueller (2006) used data for voter turnouts at a Norwegian school and made it evident 
through OLS and conditional median regression that the Herfindahl index of linguistic 
heterogeneity is negatively related to voter turnouts.  The size of the electorate also 
has a negative influence on voter turnouts.  The reason why, they argued, is that 
community size is related to the extent of heterogeneity in the community.   Earlier 
research indicated that the electoral and voting systems affect voter turnout 
(Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Blais 2006).  Funk (2007) assumes that community 
size is negatively related to the benefits that stem from avoidance of informal 
sanctions and so predict based on a signaling model that outcomes of voter turnout 
might be affected by the voting system.  Consistent with the prediction, Funk 
presented evidence that voter turnout was more decreased in smaller communities 
after introduction of optional postal voting in Switzerland. 
 
III. REVIEW OF VOTING IN JAPAN  
 
General view  
                                                   
4 Barreto et al (2004) used the individual-level turnout data in counties of the USA to 
examine how the component ratio of society has a effect on turnout.  They found that 
residing in a majority-Latino district has a positive influence on Latino voter turnout; 
by contrast, there was a negative impact on non-Hispanic voter turnout.  
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The National Assembly of Japan is made up of the House of Representatives, 
termed “Shugi-in”, and the House of Councilors, known as “Sangi-in”5.  The system 
employed to elect the House of Representatives is a combination of the single-member 
constituency system6 and proportional party representation7.  A proportion of the 
members from the House of Councilors are also elected using proportional 
representation; the remaining members are decided using a system whereby 2–8 seats 
are allocated to each prefecture.  In general terms, members are elected from small 
districts using the single-member constituency system and elected from the 
nationwide constituency using proportional representation.   
Data concerned with the results of the House of Representatives election are 
available separately for the single-member constituency and the proportional party 
representation.  This study focuses upon collective action in the smaller districts and 
is not concerned with the outcomes of proportional representation.  The following 
analysis is limited to the election of the House of Representatives. 
Table 2 outlines the current voting trends in Japanese elections8.  The first 
column shows temporal changes in the representation index, which illustrates the 
effect of an individual vote on the outcome of an election9.  The values are declining 
                                                   
5 There are three types of elections in Japan: A General Election of the House of 
Representatives, Elections of the House of Councilors, and Local Elections.   
6 In the single-member constituency system, each seat is allocated to an electoral 
district.  The mixed-system took effect in the House of Representative during the 1996 
election.  Prior to 1996, the multi-member constituency system was used, with few 
seats being allocated.  For further details of legislative representation, see Kawaura 
(2003), Meyer and Naka (1998, 1999). 
7 The proportional representation rule states that a party gains seats in proportion to 
the number of total votes for the party. 
8 I used data from the 1990 and 1993 elections, which were based upon the 
multi-member constituency system, as well as data from the 1996, 2000, and 2003 
elections, based upon the single-member system. 
9 Following the relevant literature (Atlas et al., 1995; Meyer and Naka, 1999), the 
representation index for prefecture i during year t  is defined as follows: 
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over time, meaning that the impact of an individual vote is gradually decreasing.  As 
noted by Kawaura (2003), the index is affected by changes in the number of legislators 
and the demography of voters. The marked difference in values between 1993 and 1996 
appears to reflect a change in the electoral system from the multi-member 
constituency system to the mixed system.  With the aim of controlling for institutional 
change, the relative representation index is shown in the second column10.  This index 
is more stable over time.  The third column records the fact that turnout has fallen 
steadily over time.  Controlling for change in the electoral system, the combined 
results indicate that the impact of the individual‟s vote is not related to voter turnout.  
Column 4 reveals that the distribution of votes among the parties, as measured using 
the Herfindahl index, has become less dispersed over time.  That is, votes have 
gradually become increasingly concentrated; therefore, the disparity of votes is likely 
to become more apparent. 
       In Japan, it is widely accepted that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
has relied upon the agricultural sector for strong electoral support (Hayami and Godo, 
2002)11. That is, a reliable source of votes for the LDP is the agricultural cooperative.  
The Diet members of the LDP have established a large voting constituency in rural 
areas.  Given that other parties also regard the support of the agricultural sector as 
being of utmost importance, the agricultural cooperative wields a tremendous amount 
of political power (Hayami and Godo, 2002).  In other words, both the LDP and other 
                                                                                                                                                     
it
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10 Kawaura (2003) defined the Representation index as follows:  


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11 Since World War II, the LDP has governed every year except 1993 and 1994. 
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parties are likely to be influenced by the agricultural cooperative12. 
      An additional feature of the Japanese electoral system is that candidates rely 
heavily upon the “JIBAN”, which is a strongly supportive network limited to a 
particular area and used to gain the majority of the candidate‟s votes (Miyake, 1989).  
Under an electoral system with a geography-based constituency (as in Japan), the local 
voter‟s interest and benefit are crucial in terms of improving a politician‟s chances of 
re-election.  Each party attempts to direct budgetary resources into constituencies to 
maintain electoral position (Kawaura, 2003; Meyer and Naka, 1998, 1999).  The 
supportive network “JIBAN” is made up of close-knit community members who are 
seeking to gain benefits through the election of their candidate.  In other words, a 
reciprocal relationship is formed between the candidate and the electorate, with the 
aim of a successful candidacy, via long-term personal interactions.  If a member does 
not vote or votes for other candidates, he or she is ostracized by the other members.  
When taking into account the long-term relationship within such a community, the 
cost of exclusion from the community is tremendously high (Hayami, 2001).  
Accordingly, the network informally requires that community members take collective 
action; that is, vote for the community‟s candidate.  This implies that social norms are 
indirectly associated with a cost-benefit analysis in terms of economics13. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
The economic model of voting decision holds that a rational individual computes 
                                                   
12 It is generally acknowledged that LDP is a rural-based party (Meyer and Naka, 
1998; Curtis, 1988; Reed, 1986); this is in line with the LDP‟s strong ties to the 
agricultural cooperative. 
13 The existing literature considers social norms or ethics as a psycho/sociological 
factor, and distinguishes them from rational decision making (e.g., Downs, 1957; 
Matsusaka and Palda, 1999). 
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expected benefits (EB) from voting and the direct cost of voting(C), and then votes only 
when expected benefits exceeded the cost14. The benefit-cost ratio becomes: 
C
EB
. 
 If one were to make a decision based on a benefit-cost calculation, few people 
would vote since their behavior would hardly affect the outcome of an election and 
therefore the expected benefit becomes very small.  Nevertheless, actually, voter 
turnouts are inconsistent with this model.  ITo account for actual voter turnout, many 
of works have been compiled and reported.  The social pressure to vote, which is not 
taken into account in the rational voter model, appears to provide an incentive to vote. 
(Knack 1992; Schram and van Winden 1991; Funk 2006).  To extend the rational voter 
model as above, Tollison and Willet (1973) provided a simple model that incorporated 
“sociological” benefits (SB), which come from the satisfying of a felt obligation or duty 
and response to social pressure to vote, into the benefit-cost calculation.  According to 
his model, the benefit-cost ratio becomes: 
C
SBEB 
. 
 Recently, Funk (2006) developed a more sophisticated model where benefits 
come from social esteem from showing up at the voting booth, the avoidance of social 
sanctions, or being perceived as social cooperator.  Funk argued that such effects are 
larger in more closely-knitted communities since “people know each other and gossip 
about who does do their civic duty and who does not” (Funk 2007, p.2).  This paper 
assumes that individuals vote because they are expressing themselves to raise the 
sociological benefits within a community and then applies the framework of Tollison 
                                                   
14 The direct cost is affected by the voting system.  For instance, voter registration 
raises the cost of voting, resulting in a decrease in turnout (Ansolabehere and Konisky 
2006). 
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and Willete (1973) to the empirical analysis15.   
As discussed in the previous section, the interpersonal pressure to vote seems to be 
negatively associated with the decay of social norm.  Furthermore, more homogeneous 
societies are more closely knitted through interpersonal interactions, leading to the 
stronger pressure to vote.  Lower pressure is expected to decrease “sociological” 
benefits (SB).  Following this, I raise Hypothesis 1 concerning the affect of social 
norms on voting. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Decay of norms and fractionalization result in a lower voter turnout. 
 
The supportive network of the candidate is required to engage in collective 
action within the community, and is therefore more likely to be shaped to do so in a 
more organized society due to an abundant social capital (Putnam, 2000).  In other 
words, the supportive networks are less likely to be cohesive when the social norm is 
highly undermined.  For this reason, votes are less likely to given to the 
community-supported candidate when the social norm is less enforceable. 
Putnam (2000) reports that the level of interest in political issues in the USA is 
distinctly different between generations.  This tendency is also observed in Japan 
(Miyake, 1989).  Although one of the characteristics of Japanese society is 
homogeneity in terms of race, this does not hold when heterogeneity is considered from 
an economic or generational viewpoint.  Therefore, it is worth investigating 
                                                   
15 According to the expressive voting model, “individuals vote because they are 
expressing themselves about the candidate(s) and /or issues, not because they expect to 
alter the outcomes of the election.” (Copeland and Laband 2002, p.352). The 
expressive voting model shares the similarity with the model this paper based on 
(Copeland and Laband 2002; Cebulla 2004).   
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generational and economic heterogeneity in Japan. 
In an election, a candidate declares campaign pledges that purport to benefit 
their supporters, all with the view of winning the election; however, they are likely to 
encounter difficulties in gaining the desired votes in a more heterogeneous community, 
as the interests of voters will be fractionalized.  In other words, members‟ interests 
appear to be more alike in less heterogeneous communities, enabling candidates to 
design campaign pledges that gain the support of the majority.  From the viewpoint of 
voters, a heterogeneous community is likely to experience a diverse range of campaign 
pledges among the candidates.  As a result, voters will not concentrate on a particular 
candidate, making for a close election.  In the case that the social norm is less rigorous 
or the community is heterogeneous, voters will not feel compelled to vote for the 
candidate whom their community supports.  Based on this argument, I propose the 
following empirical hypothesis concerning the distribution of votes among parties. 
. 
Hypothesis 2: A generational fractionalization and the decline of social norms will 
result in votes being distributed widely among parties 
 
IV. MODEL  
 
Data 
The data used as independent variables in the regression estimation were 
mostly sourced from the Asahi Newspaper (various years). The three exceptions were 
Gini Coefficient, number of farmers and the number of people who have graduated 
from university.  The Gini coefficient of per capita income was sourced from the 
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Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. The number 
of farmers was obtained from Index Corporation (2006).  The data of the number of 
graduates came from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.   
As mentioned in Section II, this study presents outcomes from smaller districts 
and not to those of proportional representation.  Data is, therefore, limited to the 
election of the House of Representatives16.  The data are panel-structured, consisting 
of 47 prefectures and the date of the election year (1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003)17.  
Hence, the raw data set includes various prefecture-level data on various variables.  
Gini coefficient data are scarce and can only be obtained every five years; for example, 
1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004, meaning that Gini data were not available for the election 
years used in this study.  To conduct the estimations, additional Gini data were 
generated by interpolation based on the assumption of constant changing rates 
between 1989 and 1994, 1994 and 1999, and 1999 and 2004. 
Population Census (various years), as published by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications, provided the numbers of people who graduated from 
universities every 10 years; for 1980, 1990 and 2000.  The data were generated by 
interpolations based on the assumption of constant changing rates between 1980, 1990 
and 2000.  The data of 2002 was calculated by adding the annual number who 
graduated from university of 2001 and 2002 to 2000 data.  The annual data of 2001 
and 2002 was collected from the Basic Report for Schools (various years) published by 
                                                   
16 In this study, local elections are not considered. 
17 Kaniovski and Mueller (2006) stress that data from a small electoral district must 
satisfy the criterion that the probability of a vote being decisive is close to zero.  It 
should be noted that the size of the prefecture considered in the present paper is too 
large to satisfy this criterion. 
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the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.  .  
 Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the 
regression estimation. 
 
Econometric framework 
To test the hypotheses raised in the previous section, I first examined how the 
social norm and social heterogeneity played a role in voting participation.  I then 
considered whether they affect the concentration of votes to a particular party.  The 
estimated function takes the following form: 
 
VOTE its = 1DSN1it-1  + 2DSN2it-1  + 3GINIit-1  + 4HETGENit-1 + 5RIit-1 ( or 
RRIit-1) + 6AGRIits-1 +7OWHOUSit-1+8INCOM it-1 +9SINGLits-1 +10UNIVit-1 
+11VOTRit-1 + i +uit , 
 
where VOTE its represents the dependent variable, a voting rate, in prefecture i, t is 
the year in which the election was held, s is the sex of the voter, and  values 
represents regression parameters.  Lagged values of all independent variables are 
used to control for endogeneity bias.  In other words, all independent variables are the 
value for year t-1 (t = 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2003, and t–1 = 1989, 1992, 1995, 
1999, and 2002).  iti u,  represent the individual effects of i‟s prefecture (a fixed 
effects prefecture vector) and an error term respectively.  i  is a time-invariant 
feature, while u is an error term.  Special attention must be paid to the omitted 
variable bias stemming from unobservable individual specific effects.  This can be 
controlled for via fixed effects estimation (Baltagi, 2005).  In an attempt to estimate 
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the elasticity for comparing the magnitude of dependent variables, the function takes a 
linear form18.  Accordingly, with the exception of dummy variables, dependent and 
independent variables are evaluated at the sample means, and therefore the coefficient 
values reported can be interpreted as elasticity19. 
    As shown in Table 3, it is noteworthy that the female voting rate is larger than 
that for males.  My interpretation is that this can be partly explained by expressive 
voting since females are more likely to express that their right to vote is equivalent to 
that of males.   
Matsusaka and Palda (1999) propose that social norms are constant over time.  
Further, they suggested that voter turnout can be explained by a time-varying 
variable; therefore, time-invariant social norms cannot account for voting behavior.  
However, by employing fixed effects estimation, proxies present in this research can be 
used to estimate the effects of social norms on voting behavior, even after controlling 
for time-invariant features. 
When estimating the determinants for the concentration of votes, the function 
form is the same as that shown above; however, the determinants cannot be obtained 
separately for male and female due to the limitations of the data.  Therefore, the 
                                                   
18 Unfortunately, there is no theoretical model supporting the linear form. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to theoretically justify the function form.  This is an issue 
remaining for future study. 
19 See more details for Greene (Greene1997, p.280). 
  In the linear model, exy  '  the elasticity of y with respect to changes in x is 


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This values can be estimated by them at the sample means as 
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
y
xk
kk  . 
The standard error of the elasticity of y, k , can be calculated by the delta method 
(Greene 1997, pp. 278-280). 
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sample size is 235, being half of those who voted (470).  Furthermore, concerning 
AGRI and SINGL, to capture the feature of sex, I estimate not only the model using an 
aggregated value, but also ones using male and female values, respectively. 
 
Proxies for social norms 
The variables are discussed in this section of the paper, along with a description 
of the social norm that creates an informal social pressure concerning voting behavior.  
The cost of not taking collective action, namely free riding, depends on the social norms 
that are shaped by local interactions (Funk, 2005).  Individuals are less likely to 
engage in collective action where the expectation of being ostracized by community 
members is lower due to a disorganized community and weak social norms. 
According to Putnam (2000), social disorganization can be regarded as the engine 
of free riding, as such disorganization undermines social norms.  It appears to be 
difficult to enhance collective action in areas in which population turnover is high, 
neighbors remain anonymous, and local organization is rare.  The degree to which a 
person is integrated into their community depends upon the condition of the 
community.  As argued by Putnam (2000), people that shift frequently have weaker 
ties within the community, meaning that mobile communities seem to have less 
interaction among neighbors than that in more stable communities.  In other words, 
the more mobile a community, the less cohesive it becomes20.  Hence, DSN1 and DSN2, 
denoting population turnover within a prefecture and the number of immigrants from 
                                                   
20 Also of importance is the individual‟s plans to move from the present constituency 
soon after the election, as the expected long-term benefit of voting will be reduced in 
such a case (the Japanese electoral system is based on geographical-based 
constituencies).  In contrast, the likelihood of a person voting increases with the 
length of time spent at the current address (Wolfinger and Resenstone, 1980).  It 
follows from this that individuals scheduled to move will not vote. 
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other prefectures, respectively, can be considered as proxies for a decline in social 
norms.  Accordingly, these coefficients are predicted to become negative when the 
voting participation rate is examined.  It therefore seems reasonable that the 
supportive network for a candidate will become weaker within a mobile society.  
Following from this, it can be expected that the signs for DSN1 and DSN2 will become 
positive when their impacts on the distribution of votes among the parties are tested. 
 
Fractionalization 
As discussed in the previous section, the sign of GINI, representing the Gini 
coefficient, represents economic inequality 21 . GINI will be negative, as income 
inequality is expected to lower voting participation rates.  HETGEN, denoting a 
Herfindahl-type index of age heterogeneity, is considered as a proxy for the degree of 
heterogeneity in age.  HETGEN will also become negative, as fractionalization will 
lead to a reduction in the voting participation rate due to declining collective action22.  
Furthermore, if Hypothesis 2 is valid, the signs will become positive in the estimation 
of the distribution of votes. 
 
                                                   
21 It should be noted that the Gini coefficient is associated with various disadvantages 
as a measure of inequality.  For instance, „it is useful to be able to decompose 
inequality into “between” and “within” components…the Gini coefficient is not 
decomposable, or at least not without hard-to-interpret residual terms‟ (Deaton 1997, 
p.140).   
22 Following the general index of fractionalization (Alesina and La Ferra, 2002), 
fractionalization (heterogeneity) can be written as 
 


I
i
i
N
n
FRA
1
2)(1  
Where in is the number of people in the i
th age group, N is the population, and I is the 
number of age groups in the prefecture.  Age groups are divided into 5-year categories, 
from 0–4 years to 80 years and over.  There are 17 categories in total ( I  is 17).   
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Representation index 
RI represent per capita political representation in the Legislature; that is, the 
representation index.  The existing literature provides evidence that per capita 
transfers from central to local governments are positively associated with RI (Atlas et 
al., 1995; Meyer and Naka, 1999).  Inevitably, RI is also seen to represent the 
influence of voters upon the allocation of resources; however, it is more accurate to 
state that the degree of such transfer depends on voting participation, as the allocation 
of resources will not reflect voters‟ interests if people do not vote.  In other words, 
political influence is potentially brought about through voting participation.  If a 
voter has the potential to politically influence the likelihood of any benefits, then 
people will be more inclined to vote in order to realize this potential and reap any 
benefits.  As a consequence, RI is expected to take a positive sign when voting 
participation is examined. 
To control for a bias in RI arising from changes in demography and size of the 
Legislature, Kawaura (1999) developed RRI, the relative representation index.  In 
fact, as discussed above, annual changes in RI and RRI can be marked, presumably 
due to institutional changes such as a change in the number of seats.  Therefore, both 
RI and RRI are incorporated to capture the degree of benefits of voting participation23. 
 
Control variables 
As stated above, the agricultural sector of Japan has a tremendous influence over 
the allocation of budgetary resources through their interest groups such as the 
                                                   
23 Previous studies used population as a denominator (Meyer and Naka, 1999; 
Kawaura, 2003).  To avoid measurement error, I replaced population with the number 
of people entitled to vote; however, the estimation results presented below are 
unchanged when calculated using the indices employed in previous studies. 
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agricultural cooperative (Meyer and Naka, 1998).  The agricultural sector ‟s political 
power arises from its ability to encourage its members to vote.  That is, the members 
of the agricultural sector have a strong incentive to vote, as the benefit of doing so 
outweighs any cost.  For this reason, the predicted sign of AGRI, representing the 
number of farmers, is positive for voting participation.  In addition, the LDP is 
indebted in part to the agricultural sector for being voted in as the ruling party.  From 
this, the inference can be made that members of the agricultural sector have a 
tendency to vote on a reciprocal basis with LDP members, resulting in a concentration 
of votes 24 .   As such, the sign of AGRI is predicted to be negative when the 
distribution of votes is examined. 
OWHOUS and INCOM, representing the rates of home owners and per capita 
income, respectively, are the control variables used to capture the economic conditions. 
DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) argued that homeowners have an incentive to improve 
the community in which they live to protect their investment; home ownership is a 
barrier to moving out.  This argument leads to the prediction that being a homeowner 
increases the desire to improve the community by voting.  The value of time spent in 
voting will generally be greater for higher than for lower income individuals.  Hence, 
simple economic theory would indicate that there would be less voting by higher 
income individuals because of the higher cost to them.  On the other hand, Frey 
(1971) argues that voters with high-income jobs will receive higher-quality electoral 
information; this in turn will induce them to vote25.  More precisely, individuals with 
                                                   
24 According to Schram (1992), social groups appear to play an important role in the 
choice of party (schram 1992, p428). 
25 Recent works support the positive effect of income (Greene and Nikolaev, 1999; 
Barreto et al., 2004).  This is in line with the results of cross-national studies (Blais, 
2006). 
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larger human capital can receive the higher income, indicating that high-quality 
information would be as a result of the large human capital, rather than the high 
income.  Accordingly if the human capital effect is controlled for as shown in the 
function, INCOM will take a negative sign in estimating voters‟ participation.  SINGL 
and UNIV are the number of single individuals and people who graduated from 
university, respectively.  Those who are married and living with spouses can share 
the costs of voting, such as going to the poll booth.  SINGL will take the negative sign 
in the estimation of voting participation26.  According to existing reports (Campbell et 
al. 1960; Greene and Nikolaev 1999; Nie et al. 1996; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), a 
tertiary education makes people more likely to vote.  UNIV is incorporated to include 
the human capital effects.  Only AGRI and SINGL can be obtained separately as male 
and female; therefore, other independent variables take the same value for male and 
female. 
 
V. RESULTS  
 
I prefer the model using RRI to RI since RRI is modified index as mentioned in the 
previous section.  Further, in order to capture the difference between male and female, 
I prefer the model incorporating MALE DUMMY in Table 4 and ones using male and 
female values for AGRI and SINGL in Table 5.  Therefore, the result presented in 
column (4) is the most preferable in Table 4 and 5.   
 
Results of voter turnout 
                                                   
26 Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) assert that married people are more likely to vote 
than single people. 
21 
 
  Both Tables 4 and 5 list the results of the fixed effects estimations.  Table 4 
presents the results concerning voting participation, while the results regarding the 
distribution of votes are listed in Table 5.  As mentioned earlier, the values are 
elasticity, and those in parentheses are t-values calculated using the delta method.  
The results of a Hausman test, which is concerned with the null-hypothesis that there 
is a systematic difference between the fixed and random effects estimators, is 
presented in the bottom row.  „Yes‟ suggests that there is systematic difference 
between the models.  This means that the fixed effects model can be justified in all 
cases; therefore, it is employed instead of the random effects model (Hsiao 1986).   
This section concentrates on the results presented in Table 4.  With respect to 
the decline in social norms, both DSN1 and DSN2 are close to displaying the 
significant negative signs predicted in the previous section.  This tells us that a 
decline in social norms has resulted in people not voting.  As for economic and 
generational heterogeneities, the signs for GINI and HETGEN are consistently 
negative and almost statistically significant.  As a whole, the coefficients on norms 
and fractionalization are very stable and robust against differing specifications.  This 
suggests that both income and generational fractionalization impede voting 
participation.  When compared to proxies for norms such as DSN1 and DSN2, the 
heterogeneity variables are significantly larger in absolute values.  In particular, the 
values for HETGEN are distinctly larger.  This indicates that fractionalization, 
especially generational fractionalization, has a greater detrimental effect on voting 
participation than does the decay of norms.    I interpret these results as follows.  
Japan experienced unprecedented economic growth in the post-war period, which 
presumably led to differences in preference among generations.  The influence of 
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generational heterogeneity is likely to reflect the differences in experiences among 
generations.  When combined, these results are sufficiently robust to support 
Hypothesis 1. 
With respect to political representation, the coefficients of RI produced a positive 
sign, as predicted, and were statistically significant at the 1% level in all estimations. 
Contrary to expectations, the signs of RRI are negative in columns (3) and (4).  
Furthermore, the coefficients of RI are four times larger by absolute value than RRI, 
implying that RI has greater elasticity than RRI.  The institutional and demographic 
changes seem to account for the difference between RI and RRI.  Given that it is more 
appropriate to use RRI for the estimation, the RRI result represents the true effect of 
political presentation.  The combined results (of RI and RRI) suggest that the nominal 
political representation, not the actual representation, enhances voting participation. 
AGRI produced the expected result, with positive coefficient signs that are 
statistically significant and that indirectly reflect the strong influence of the 
agricultural sector on the outcomes of elections.  The absolute values of coefficients 
are about 0.22, implying that an increase of number of farmers by 1 % leads to increase 
of voting rates by 0.22 %.   As a result, the accepted characteristics of the political 
system in Japan are statistically supported.  OWHOUS does not yield the expected 
positive sign, but is statistically insignificant.  This result implies that owing your 
own home does not create a supportive network among residents and does not play a 
role in voting participation.  Consistent with the prediction, INCOM produced 
negative signs in all estimations, despite being statistically insignificant.  Its absolute 
coefficient values of INCOM are slightly less than 0.0127.   
                                                   
27 This is supported by the argument of Kawaura (2003) that wealthy areas may 
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As expected, SINGL possesses a negative sign in all estimations.  From this 
result, I propose that single people have are less likely to vote.  The signs of UNIV are 
positive and stable in all estimations. This result is consistent with the results of 
earlier studies (e.g., Knack, 1992; Greene and Nikolaev, 1999).  Its absolute values are 
approximately 0.03.  That is, human capital is positively related to voting 
participation and the increase in the number of graduates by 1 % results in a 0.03 % 
increase in voting rates.  The signs of MALE DUMMY are different between columns 
(2) and (4), suggesting that there is no difference between sexes after controlling for 
various factors.  
 
Results of the distribution of votes 
The following is a discussion of the estimation results concerning the distribution 
of votes amongst the parties, as shown in Table 5.  
In all estimations concerned with the decline in social norms, both coefficients of 
DSN1 and DSN2 produced the expected positive signs.  Furthermore, DSN1 is 
statistically significant in all estimations.  The magnitudes of DSN1, which are 
between 0.15 and 0.18, are approximately two times larger than those of DSN2.  It 
follows from this that population turnover within a community has a more serious 
detrimental effect upon the voting than does immigrants from outside the community.   
These results, which are stable and robust to alternative specifications, illustrate that 
the decline in social norms leads to a reduction in the level of voting.  This is 
consistent with expectations and strongly supports Hypothesis 2. 
Focusing now on economic heterogeneities, all signs of GINI are negative but are 
                                                                                                                                                     
benefit from budget allocations to a lesser extent, meaning that the benefit of voting for 
this group is slight. 
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statistically significant only in column (1).  The results related to generational 
heterogeneity, recorded as HETGEN, produce a negative sign in all estimations and 
are statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1), (2), and (3).  Further, the 
value of HETGEN is extremely large.  This implies a concentration of the votes of a 
heterogeneous community, especially age heterogeneity, to a single party, which is 
contrary to predictions.  As a consequence, the results concerning the effects of social 
norms are in line with Hypothesis 2, while those of fractionalization are not.  In other 
words, these results are partly consistent with Hypothesis 2.28  Although this result is 
puzzling and requires further discussion, an explanations for this is that the role of the 
sense of „civic duty‟ in the decision to vote or abstain is related to the act of casting a 
vote per se, but does not play a role in the individual party choice decision (Schram 
1992). 
In terms of political representation, the signs for the coefficients of RI and RRI 
are negative, with the absolute values of RI being larger than those for RRI.  
Furthermore, RI is statistically significant at the 1% level whereas RRI is insignificant 
in all estimations.  The results for the distribution of votes are equivalent to those for 
voting participation.  This suggests that voters with a high level of political 
representation have a tendency to vote for a particular candidate.  The nominal 
political representation (RI) is more elastic than the actual representation (RRI). 
The results for AGRI (TOTAL) reveal that its coefficients produced negative signs, 
                                                   
28 As discussed above, the LDP has been the dominant party in Japan for some time 
and has been sustained by a supportive network that produces large numbers of votes.  
If this is true, the concentration of votes among the other parties is due in large part to 
the votes given to LDP.  I examined the votes for LDP in the same manner as that 
described above and found that a decline in social norms is associated with a reduction 
in the number of votes for LDP, which is consistent with the inference.  This result, 
which is not reported in this paper due to space limitations, is available from the 
author upon request. 
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while being statistically significant at the 1 % level.  This mirrors the fact that the 
LDP depends upon the agricultural sector to maintain its position by gaining votes 
through its interest groups.  It follows that the votes are likely to be concentrated on a 
particular party, namely the LDP; in fact, nearly half of all votes are cast for the LDP29.  
When I disaggregate AGRI (TOTAL) into AGRI (MALE) and AGRI (FEMALE), it is 
surprising to observe that AGRI (MALE) takes positive signs while AGRI (FEMALE) 
takes the opposite negative sings in all estimations.  These values are distinctly large 
and statistically significant.  This tells me that the behavior of females is out of line 
with the expectation.  Further the values of AGRI (MALE) of about -3.30 are larger 
than those of AGRI (FEMALE) of about 2.80 so that the total effects become negative 
as shown above.  I interpret this as reflecting a political gender gap, as noted by Funk 
and Gathmann (2007)30. 
The signs of OWHOUS and INCOME become positive.  It is difficult to ascertain 
a logical causality for these results and so their interpretation is open to discussion. 
SINGL(TOTAL) produced positive signs, indicating that the votes of single people 
are inclined to be dispersed.    That is, single people are less likely to form a 
homogeneous community amongst themselves and vote for a particular party.  The 
negative sings of AGRI (MALE) and the positive ones of AGRI (FEMALE) also mirror 
the political gender gap.  This tells me that single males are apt to have similar 
opinions whereas single females are likely to have different ones.  It is generally 
known that males are more likely to continue in full-time job than females in Japan; 
therefore, compared with males, there is a wider rage of work conditions among 
                                                   
29 Based upon the samples used in the present paper, the LDP gained 45% of all votes. 
30 Funk and Gathmann (2007) used the data from Switzerland to provide evidence 
that woman are more likely to support expenditure for public goods like environment, 
but oppose defense spending and subsidies for agriculture. 
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females, leading females to take more various opinions concerning policy issues.  
With respect to UNIV, significant negative signs appear in all columns and take 
values between 0.11 and 0.15, implying that individuals graduated from university 
tend to be concentrated.  This allows various interpretations.  For instance, I would 
consider voters with large human capital accumulations from the viewpoint of 
fractionalization.  Voters with a higher education seem to share a similar preference 
for a candidate, which is relevant in the discussion of fractionalization (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2000).  That is, they seem to form a homogeneous community amongst 
themselves and to vote for a particular party; this conforms to previously suggested 
results of voting participation.   
  Various estimated results have been presented above.  Taken together, the 
conclusion reached is that the estimation results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 
in part with Hypothesis 2.  The results show that fractionalization has a positive 
effect on voting participation but a negative influence on the concentration of votes for 
a particular candidate; this is a puzzling effect. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Voting participation is plausibly considered as collective action and appears to 
be affected by the social condition.  Recent studies have shown that it is not only the 
decline in social norms that impedes collective action, but also social heterogeneity 
(Vigdor 2004; Yamamura 2008b).  In Japan, where society is regarded as having a 
relatively low degree of heterogeneity, it appears that a candidate can gain votes 
through a social network shaped by long-term local interaction; however, few 
researchers have attempted to examine the extent to which these social factors affect 
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voting behavior in Japan.  This paper examines the effect of social norms and 
fractionalization on voting behavior and presents joint evidence concerning voting 
participation and the distribution of votes among parties.  Even after controlling for 
factors related to the individual‟s economic benefit and time-invariant fixed effects, the 
outcomes for voting behavior were influenced by social norms and fractionalization.  
The key findings obtained from an analysis based on fixed effects estimation are as 
follows. 
(1) The voter turnout is higher in a close-knit community; therefore, social 
capital enhances voting. 
(2) Economic and generational fractionalization results in a lower voter turnout. 
      (3) a scarcity of social capital leads to a weak distribution of votes among 
parties. 
 
    In summary of the evidence presented above, this empirical study provides 
evidence that collective action is enhanced by social norms and low degrees of 
generational and income fractionalization.  The results of this study explain one 
aspect of human nature related to social existence: the attitudes of others influence 
voting behavior.  These findings, obtained using a fixed effects estimation, can bridge 
the relationship between voting participation and the distribution of votes among 
parties. 
    Both voting participation and the concentration of votes are considered as 
collective action in the case of an election; however, the results of this study 
demonstrate that the effects of social norms and fractionalization are not similar.  
This raises further questions that require additional investigation, especially as to why 
28 
 
fractionalization has an obvious effect upon voting participation but little impact upon 
the distribution of votes. 
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Table 1  Results of existing research to ascertain voter turnout. 
Authors Sample  
 
Methodology Variables Aims Results 
Kaniovski and Mueller 
(2006) 
 
 
Norwegian school 
district referendums 
OLS  
Conditional Median  
Herfindahl index of 
linguistic heterogeneity 
The size of electorate 
 
Examine effects of 
heterogeneity  
 Negative  
Knack (1992) 
 
Social Sanction 
Survey (USA) 
National Election 
Study (USA) 
Logit                   Regular Churchgoer 
New comer 
Social Sanction 
 
Examine effects of norms 
and social sanction 
 Positive  
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Table 2  Temporal changes in voting rates and distribution of votes among parties. 
Year Representation 
index 
 
Relative 
representation 
index 
Turnout rate a Herfindahl 
index of votes 
1990 
 
4.83*10-6 1.158 76.9 0.64 
1993 4.72*10-6 
 
1.150 70.7 0.72 
1996 2.65*10-6 
 
1.113 62.3 0.68 
2000 
 
2.64*10-6 1.119 64.8 0.65 
2003 2.61*10-6 
 
1.113 61.6 0.60 
Notes:   a %.   
The values are simple averages of yearly values over the period 1988–2001.  The data 
are sourced from Minryoku, edited by Asahi Newspaper. 
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Table 3  Definitions of variables, means, and standard deviations. 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
TURN 
 
Turnout rate(Total) 0.67 0.08 
TURN 
 (MALE) 
Turnout rate(Male) 0.67 0.07 
TURN 
 (FEMALE) 
Turnout rate (Female) 0.68 0.08 
DSN1 
 
Population turnover within prefecture a 7.19 8.58 
DSN2 
 
Number of immigrants from other 
prefectures a 
6.36 7.97 
GINI Gini coefficient of per capita income 
 
0.29 0.01 
HETGEN Herfindahl-type index of age heterogeneity 
 
0.93 0.01 
RI 
 
Representation index 
(Atlas et al., 1995; Meyer and Naka, 1999) 
0.46*10-5 0.18*10-5 
RRI 
 
Relative representation index  
(Kawamura, 2003) 
1.13 0.20 
AGRI Number of farmers (Total)a 
 
3.13 1.46 
AGRI 
(MALE) 
Number of farmers (Male) a 
 
1.52 0.71 
AGRI 
(FEMALE) 
Number of farmers (Female)a 
 
1.60 0.74 
OWHOUS 
 
rates of home owners. 0.67 0.8 
INCOM 
 
Per capita income b 
 
2.83 0.41 
SINGL 
 
SINGL 
(MALE) 
Number of single people (Total) a  
 
Number of single people (Male) a 
6.12 
 
3.41 
6.83 
 
3.87 
SINGL Number of single people (Female) a 2.71 2.97 
(FEMALE)    
UNIV  
 
Number of people who graduated from 
university a  
2.72 3.88 
Notes:   a In ten thousands. 
b In millions of Yen. 
The values are simple averages of yearly values over the period 1988–2001.  
 
 
 
 Table 4  Regression results for the voting rate (fixed effects estimation). 
Variable (1)  (2)   (3) (4) 
DSN1 
 
-0.04* 
(-2.08) 
-0.04* 
(-2.08) 
-0.03* 
(-1.66) 
-0.03* 
(-1.66) 
DSN2 
 
-0.04* 
(-2.13) 
-0.04* 
(-2.12) 
-0.06** 
(-2.98) 
-0.06** 
(-2.97) 
GINI -0.11 
(-1.63) 
-0.11 
(-1.63) 
-0.12* 
(-1.82) 
-0.12* 
(-1.82) 
HETGEN -7.65** 
(-7.40) 
-7.65** 
(-7.39) 
-10.0** 
(-21.3) 
-10.0** 
(-21.3) 
RI 
 
0.04** 
(2.59) 
0.04** 
(2.58) 
  
RRI 
 
  -0.01 
(-0.22) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
AGRI 0.22** 
(9.61) 
0.22** 
(9.32) 
0.23** 
(10.4) 
0.23** 
(10.1) 
OWHOUS 
 
-0.12 
(-0.76) 
-0.12 
(-0.75) 
-0.11 
(-0.68) 
-0.11 
(-0.69) 
INCOM 
 
-0.08 
(-1.47) 
-0.08 
(-1.46) 
-0.09 
(-1.64) 
-0.09 
(-1.62) 
SINGL 
 
-0.01 
(-1.63) 
-0.01 
(-1.33) 
-0.01 
(-1.43) 
-0.01 
(-1.24) 
UNIV  
 
0.03** 
(2.39) 
0.03** 
(2.36) 
0.04** 
(3.20) 
0.04** 
(3.18) 
MALE 
 DUMMY 
 -0.01 
(-0.03) 
 0.03 
(0.11) 
Adjusted 
 R square 
0.83 0.83 
 
0.83 0.83 
 
Sample 
Groups 
470 
47 
470 
47 
470 
47 
470 
47 
Hasman-test 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics obtained using the delta method. * and 
** indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively (one-sided tests). 
„Yes‟ suggests that there is systematic difference between the fixed effects and random 
effects model.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5.  Regression results for the distribution of votes (fixed effects estimation). 
Variable (1)  (2)   (3) (4) 
DSN1 
 
0.18** 
(2.38) 
0.16* 
(2.23) 
0.17** 
(2.33) 
0.15* 
(2.08) 
DSN2 
 
0.08 
(1.19) 
0.05 
(0.80) 
0.11 
(1.62) 
0.08 
(1.13) 
GINI -0.33 
(-1.53) 
-0.38* 
(-1.79) 
-0.30 
(-1.39) 
-0.35 
(-1.65) 
HETGEN -10.4** 
(-3.06) 
-9.75** 
(-2.92) 
-3.53** 
(-2.36) 
-2.80* 
(-1.91) 
RI -0.14** 
(-2.35) 
-0.14** 
(-2.43) 
  
RRI 
 
  -0.08 
(-1.18) 
-0.10 
(-1.49) 
AGRI 
(TOTAL) 
-0.35** 
(-4.06) 
 -0.40** 
(-4.85) 
 
AGRI 
(MALE) 
 -3.29** 
(-2.92) 
 -3.34** 
(-2.93) 
AGRI 
(FEMALE) 
 2.82** 
(2.58) 
 2.81** 
(2.54) 
OWHOUS 
 
1.00* 
(1.92) 
0.91* 
(1.76) 
0.95* 
(1.81) 
0.84 
(1.61) 
INCOM 
 
0.10 
(0.59) 
0.09 
(0.54) 
0.15 
(0.86) 
0.15 
(0.85) 
SINGL 
(TOTAL) 
0.23 
(0.97) 
 0.11 
(0.49) 
 
SINGLE 
(MALE) 
 -0.57 
(-1.19) 
 -0.73 
(-1.51) 
SINGLE 
(FEMALE) 
 0.64 
(1.47) 
 0.69 
(1.54) 
UNIV  
 
-0.11** 
(-2.33) 
-0.14** 
(-2.70) 
-0.12** 
(-2.44) 
-0.15** 
(-2.88) 
Adjusted  
R square 
0.31 0.33 
 
0.29 0.32 
 
Sample 
Groups 
235 
47 
235 
47 
235 
47 
235 
47 
Hausman-test Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics obtained using the delta method. * and 
** indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively (one-sided tests). 
„Yes‟ suggests that there is systematic difference between the fixed effects and random 
effects model.   
 
 
 
